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I. Introduction
The collateral source rule bars a defendant from introducing
evidence of payments or benefits a plaintiff received from a third
party.1 While the rule is a longstanding staple of American tort
law, it nonetheless invokes fervent debate.2 On one hand, the rule
ratifies a windfall in favor of the plaintiff by allowing her to
recover for expenses she never personally incurred.3 This seems
contrary to certain aims of tort law, such as the principle that
compensatory damages should make a plaintiff whole.4 On the
other hand, the collateral source rule deters tortfeasors by
ensuring that the defendant pays the entirety of the plaintiff’s
medical expenses, regardless of whether the plaintiff or her
health insurance provider were actually required to pay the bills.5
1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (1979) (“Payments
made or benefits conferred by other sources are known as collateral-source
benefits. They do not have the effect of reducing the recovery against the
defendant.”).
2. Compare Jamie L. Wershbale, Tort Reform in America: Abrogating the
Collateral Source Rule Across the States, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 346, 357 (2008) (“The
collateral source rule is an outmoded common law doctrine, no longer
appropriate in the age of insurance, managed care, and public benefit
programs.”), with Michael I. Krauss & Jeremy Kidd, Collateral Source and
Tort’s Soul, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1, 1 (2009) (“Indeed, the collateral source
rule may be the ‘canary in the coal mine’: Its modification or elimination might
endanger the integrity of tort law and signal the loss of ‘tort’s soul.’”).
3. See, e.g., 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITYRESTITUTION § 8.6(3) (2d ed. 1993) (“In the most typical case, the rule permits
the plaintiff to recover full payment of his medical expenses from his own
medical, health, or accident insurance and also to recover the full reasonable
value of the same medical expenses from the defendant.”).
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (1979) (“The injured
party’s net loss may have been reduced correspondingly, and to the extent that
the defendant is required to pay the total amount there may be a double
compensation for a part of the plaintiff's injury.”).
5. See id. (“One way of stating this conclusion is to say that it is the
tortfeasor’s responsibility to compensate for all harm that he causes, not
confined to the net loss that the injured party receives.”).

18

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 16 (2015)

Outside factors such as healthcare reform and tort reform have
contributed to the ongoing debate about the continued relevance
of the collateral source rule.6
The purpose of the collateral source rule is best understood in
conjunction with the reasonable value doctrine.7 That doctrine
states that a plaintiff is entitled to recover the reasonable value
of her past medical expenses.8 While not dispositive of the issue,9
many states presume that the amount billed for medical
treatment represents its reasonable value.10 This presumption
creates a disparity, however, when the healthcare provider
accepts an amount lower than what was charged in full
satisfaction of the bill.11 Healthcare providers frequently accept
these lower amounts through negotiated discount agreements
with health insurance carriers.12 In states where the collateral
6. See Adam G. Todd, An Enduring Oddity: The Collateral Source Rule in
the Face of Tort Reform, the Affordable Care Act, and Increased Subrogation, 43
MCGEORGE L. REV. 695, 977–87 (2012) (arguing that the renewed debate over
the collateral source rule brought on by healthcare reform and tort reform has
done little to actually change the rule in most jurisdictions).
7. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 8.1(3) (presenting the intersection between
the reasonable value doctrine and the collateral source rule).
8. See id. (“The value of medical and related treatment reasonably
necessary to minimize or alleviate injury itself or the pain or disability that
results from it are almost always recoverable as items of damage against the
tortfeasor who caused the personal injury.”).
9. See id. (“The measure of recovery is not the cost of services or
appliances needed but their reasonable value.”).
10. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-413.01 (2015) (“[T]he authenticity of
bills for medical services provided and the reasonableness of the charges of the
health care provider shall be rebuttably presumed upon identification by the
plaintiff of the original bill or a duly authenticated copy and [certain testimony
requirements].”); W. VA. CODE § 57-5-4j (2015) (“Proof that medical, hospital and
doctor bills were paid or incurred because of any illness, disease or injury shall
be prima facie evidence that such bills so paid or incurred were necessary and
reasonable.”).
11. See Rebecca Levenson, Comment, Allocating the Costs of Harm to
Whom They Are Due: Modifying the Collateral Source Rule After Health Care
Reform, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 932 (2012) (“Collateral sources often do not pay
for medical services at full price, allowing an insured claimant to receive
medical care at a reduced rate.”).
12. See, e.g., What’s the Cost?: Proposals to Provide Consumers with Better
Information About Healthcare Service Costs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 109th Cong. 106 (2006)
(statement of Dr. Gerard Anderson, Professor, Bloomberg School of Public
Health & School of Medicine at Johns Hopkins University; Director, Johns
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source rule bars evidence of this discount, a plaintiff may recover
the entire billed amount—a sum that some have characterized as
a windfall.13
This Note addresses whether the collateral source rule
should bar a defendant from introducing evidence that a portion
of a plaintiff’s medical expenses was written off by the healthcare
provider pursuant to a negotiated discount agreement with the
plaintiff’s health insurance carrier. Part II of this Note provides
the historical background of the collateral source rule and
discusses the arguments supporting and criticizing its continued
applicability. Part III introduces the write-off issue and identifies
the dominant approaches courts take to solve it. Part IV analyzes
these approaches and suggests a workable solution that can serve
as a compromise to reduce inflated damage awards while still
retaining the important protections of the collateral source rule.
II. Historical Background of the Collateral Source Rule
The collateral source rule first appeared in Propeller
Monticello v. Mollison.14 This case arose from a dispute following
a collision between a schooner and a propeller on Lake Huron.15
The propeller, who was found to be at fault, argued that the
schooner’s recovery should be reduced by the amount the
schooner received from insurance for the lost vessel.16 The
Hopkins Center for Hospital Finance and Management) [hereinafter Healthcare
Service Costs Hearing] (“Insurers obtain large discounts off . . . list prices—often
as high as 75 percent.”); Lucette Lagando, California Hospitals Open Books,
Showing Huge Price Differences, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 27, 2004),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB110410465492809649 (last visited Jun. 5, 2015)
(“List prices are usually charged only to uninsured patients. Health plans
negotiate big discounts and the government essentially dictates what it will
pay.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. See Levenson, supra note 11, at 933 (“As a result of double payments
and inflated awards, opponents blame the collateral source rule for increasing
insurance payments and encouraging claimants to go to trial.”); Wershbale,
supra note 2, at 350 (“In tort litigation, the written-off amount may be
considered ‘phantom’ or ‘illusory’ damages. The amount written-off is often a
substantial sum.”).
14. 58 U.S. 152 (1854).
15. Id. at 153.
16. Id.
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Supreme Court found that “[t]he contact with the insurer is in
the nature of a wager between third parties, with which the
trespasser has no concern.”17 Since this rule first appeared, it has
been nearly universally accepted as a fundamental pillar of the
American tort system.18
The collateral source rule is generally conceptualized as
having an evidentiary function and a substantive function.19 As
an evidentiary rule, it permits trial courts to exclude evidence of
collateral payments, such as payments made by a plaintiff’s
medical insurance carrier or workers’ compensation benefits.20 As
a substantive rule, it permits triers-of-fact to disregard collateral
payments when calculating damages after determining liability.21
The practical effect of the collateral source rule is that a plaintiff
may receive compensation from her health insurance carrier to
pay her medical bills without diminishing the amount she can
recover against the tortfeasor—despite the possibility of a double
recovery.22
A. Rationales for the Collateral Source Rule
The original justifications for the collateral source rule were
that it would deter potential tortfeasors and ensure that
tortfeasors would not benefit from the plaintiff’s choice to

17. Id. at 155.
18. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 8.6(3) (“Except as modified by statute, the
rule is almost invariably accepted in the courts.”); Krauss & Kidd, supra note 2,
at 7–9 (documenting the rise of the collateral source rule in American, English,
and Canadian law); Todd, supra note 6, at 965 (“The rule is, in fact, alive and
well in American courthouses despite being subject to forces that many
predicted would lead to its demise.”).
19. See Todd, supra note 6, at 969–70 (“Courts treat the collateral source
rule as a rule of evidence and a substantive rule of law.”).
20. See id. at 970 (“It allows courts to exclude evidence during trial
concerning collateral compensation . . . .”).
21. See id. (“It allows courts . . . to calculate damages once the trier of fact
establishes liability.”).
22. See id. (“In the medical insurance context, the collateral source rule
allows a plaintiff to receive compensation from her insurer for medical expenses
related to her injuries and receive cumulative compensation for the same
economic damages from the tortfeasor.”).
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maintain insurance coverage.23 Both rationales persist today to
justify the rule’s continued applicability.24 As a deterrent, the
rule ensures that a tortfeasor pays the entire cost of the harm she
causes the plaintiff.25 As a mechanism to prevent defendants from
benefiting from a plaintiff’s choice to elect insurance coverage, the
rule validates a windfall in favor of the plaintiff to prevent a
windfall in favor of the defendant.26
The collateral source rule works in conjunction with the
reasonable value rule to ensure that triers-of-fact calculate the
plaintiff’s damages for past medical expenses not by the actual
cost the plaintiff incurred, but by the reasonable value of the
medical care.27 Without the collateral source rule, the trier-of-fact
could ignore the reasonable value rule and simply award the
amount the plaintiff actually paid, without regard for any other
expenses the plaintiff may have incurred or whether the amount

23. See Levenson, supra note 11, at 927 (“Originally, courts justified the
collateral source rule as a means of promoting tort deterrence and ensuring that
a defendant tortfeasor would not benefit from the injured claimant’s insurance
coverage.”).
24. See id. at 928–31 (presenting arguments supporting the collateral
source rule).
25. See id. at 928–29 (“[Advocates for the collateral source rule] assert that
it is fundamental to tort law for tortfeasors to pay the consequences for their
actions, and that the deterrent effect of tort law is undermined when a
claimant’s medical expenses are covered by his own insurance.”).
26. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 8.6(3) (“Perhaps the weakest argument
made in support of the collateral source rule is the one that has been most
mentioned by the courts—the wrongdoing defendant should not get the benefit
of any reduction in the plaintiff’s damages by a collateral source, since this
would be a ‘windfall’ . . . .”); Krauss & Kidd, supra note 2, at 28 (arguing that the
collateral source rule ensures that the plaintiff’s damages correlate with the
defendant’s wrongdoing rather than make the plaintiff whole); Todd, supra note
6, at 974 (“Notions of fairness and justice favor the defendant-tortfeasor paying
for all of the damages of his tortious behavior and not receiving the benefits of
collateral source compensation provided to the plaintiff by an insurance
policy.”); Todd R. Lyle, Comment, Phantom Damages and the Collateral Source
Rule: How Recent Hyperinflation in Medical Costs Disturbs South Carolina’s
Application of the Collateral Source Rule, 65 S.C. L. REV. 853, 855 (2014) (“[I]f a
windfall is going to occur, it should favor the innocent plaintiff as opposed to the
defendant.”).
27. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 8.1(3) (“Indeed, recovery does not depend on
whether there is any bill at all, because under the collateral source rule the
tortfeasor is liable for the value of the services even if they are given without
charge.”).
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accepted as payment was reasonable.28 This rationale is
undermined, however, by the fact that many states constrain the
role of the trier-of-fact by enacting statutory presumptions that
the amount billed for medical services reflects its reasonable
value.29
A modern rationale for the collateral source rule’s continued
applicability is that it allows plaintiffs to finance litigation in the
face of contingency fees that could total as much as fifty percent
of a plaintiff’s recovery.30 In essence, the rule allows plaintiffs to
be made whole after insurance premiums, attorney’s fees, and
other costs that are not reimbursed by a collateral source are
factored into the plaintiff’s ultimate economic situation after
recovery.31 This justification is not applicable in cases in which
courts award attorneys’ fees and costs to a plaintiff, yet
nonetheless apply the collateral source rule.32
In cases in which the collateral source is the plaintiff’s
insurance carrier, another rationale for the rule is that the
plaintiff paid for the benefit of health insurance through monthly
insurance premium payments.33 This rationale does not apply,
however, to collateral sources the plaintiff did not pay for, such as
gratuitous payments from relatives or other philanthropic third
28. See id. (“Recovery is not limited to expenses of treatment or even to
expenses for relief of pain. Any reasonable expense, adequately proved to be a
result of the injury, is an item of damage.”). But see id. (“It has been said,
however, that if the provider of medical services charges less than their value
without intending a gift, the plaintiff’s recovery is limited to the liability
incurred.”).
29. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (providing examples of
statutory provisions that give medical bills a presumption of reasonability).
30. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 8.6(3) (“[I]t is clear that a winning plaintiff
may still recover only half of his losses unless he can pad the award with pain
and suffering damages or collateral source rule damages to absorb fees and
expenses.”).
31. See Levenson, supra note 11, at 929–30 (“[Advocates for the collateral
source rule] argue that collateral sources never pay the full costs of recovery to
the plaintiff . . . .”).
32. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 8.6(3) (“If this were the only reason for
adoption of the collateral source rule, the rule should not apply at all in those
cases where attorney fees are separately awarded against the losing
defendant.”).
33. See id. (“[I]t is possible to argue that the plaintiff paid for the benefit he
is receiving and that the defendant ought not benefit from the plaintiff’s
investment.”).
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parties.34 It has also been criticized on the grounds that a
potential plaintiff likely does not maintain her insurance
coverage because she expects a double recovery in the event she
is wronged.35 In addition, the amount the plaintiff paid into the
insurance fund does not necessarily correlate with the amount of
collateral source payments she receives.36
A final justification for the rule is that, after her insurance
carrier exercises its subrogation rights, the plaintiff has no
double recovery.37 Subrogation is typically accomplished by
allowing an insurance carrier to seek reimbursement from the
plaintiff following a judgment, although an insurance carrier can
also subrogate by directly asserting the rights of the insured
against a defendant.38 Some have suggested that subrogation
rights and the collateral source rule work in tandem, each serving
as a justification for the other.39 This rationale is weakened,
however, by the fact that courts apply the collateral source rule
even in cases in which no subrogation rights exist.40 A second
objection to this rationale is that it ignores the costs associated
with subrogation.41 While the continued application of the
collateral source rule and enforcement of subrogation rights may
lower premiums for medical insurance carriers, this system
34. See id. (“This argument cannot be made in all cases, because the
plaintiff has not chosen to pay for all collateral source benefits.”).
35. See id. (“Denying the plaintiff a double recovery will thus not frustrate
the plaintiff’s expectation . . . .”).
36. See id. (“[A]lthough the plaintiff paid premiums for his insurance, he
did not necessarily pay an amount equal to the benefits.”).
37. See Levenson, supra note 11, at 930–31 (describing the effect of
subrogation on the plaintiff’s ultimate recovery in personal injury litigation);
Krauss & Kidd, supra note 2, at 31 (“Where subrogation is conventionally
agreed to, the application of the [collateral source rule] is not problematic.”).
38. See Todd, supra note 6, at 987 (discussing the role of subrogation in the
debate about the collateral source rule).
39. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 8.6(3) (“Courts have often suggested that
protection of subrogation rights justifies the collateral source rule.”).
40. See id. (“However, most courts have not limited the collateral source
rule to cases in which subrogation rights exist, so this reason applies at best
only to one group of collateral source cases.”); see also Wershbale, supra note 2,
at 349–50 (indicating that even where subrogation rights exist, insurance
carriers often choose not to pursue them due to high administrative costs or
potential damage to the insurer’s reputation).
41. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 8.6(3) (“A more important objection is that
there are costs in making subrogation work.”).
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contributes to higher premiums for liability insurance carriers
who bear the bulk of the added expense.42
B. Criticism of the Collateral Source Rule
While the collateral source rule still exists in most
jurisdictions, it nonetheless garners sharp criticism about its
continued relevance.43 The primary criticism of the collateral
source rule is that it is inconsistent with the notion of corrective
justice: the view that the goal of tort law should be to make the
plaintiff whole.44 A double-recovery facilitated by the rule does
not serve this purpose because the plaintiff is, from a purely
economic standpoint, in a better position than she was before the
harm.45 Some argue that allowing the double-recovery amounts to
a disguised form of additional punitive damages.46 This argument
largely fails, however, because in many cases there simply is not
a double-recovery after the plaintiff’s insurance carrier exercises
its subrogation rights and the plaintiff pays her attorney.47
42. See id. (“Rejection of the collateral source rule might save citizens in
general more premium money by providing a credit and eliminating the expense
of subrogation itself.”).
43. See Todd, supra note 6, at 971 (“These debates reflect disagreement
about the collateral source rule specifically and the nature and purpose of tort
law in general.”); Krauss & Kidd, supra note 2, at 11–12 (enumerating the
grounds upon which scholars have attacked the collateral source rule);
Levenson, supra note 11, at 922 (framing the debate about the collateral source
rule over the last few decades).
44. See id. (“The collateral source rule is inconsistent with corrective or
compensatory notions of justice found in other areas of tort law.”).
45. See id. at 972 (“This double recovery scenario creates a situation where
the plaintiff is put in a better position than before the tort occurred, thereby
conflicting with the compensatory function of tort law.”).
46. See Levenson, supra note 11, at 932 (“For those opponents who view the
purpose of tort law as solely compensatory, the collateral source rule seems to
facilitate the payment of additional punitive damages.”).
47. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 8.6(3) (describing the effect of subrogation
and litigation finance on the plaintiff’s perceived double recovery facilitated by
the collateral source rule); Krauss & Kidd, supra note 2, at 22 (“[T]he [collateral
source rule] could also be viewed as a slapdash method by which to compensate
for other shortcomings of the tort system, such as non-recoverable attorney’s
fees.”); Todd, supra note 6, at 976 (presenting the argument that collateral
source rule serves to adequately compensate and otherwise undercompensated
plaintiff under the current system).
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Another flaw with the corrective justice criticism is that tort law
does not exist solely to make the plaintiff whole; rather, there are
many instances in which a plaintiff may recover more than her
economic losses.48
Some have questioned the collateral source rule following
healthcare reform.49 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (PPACA),50 specifically the individual mandate,51 altered the
rationale behind the collateral source rule.52 The individual
mandate introduced a new class of plaintiffs—the willfully
uninsured.53 These plaintiffs who elect to incur a tax penalty
rather than procure health insurance will benefit from the
collateral source rule.54 The rule makes the plaintiff’s status as
insured or uninsured irrelevant to the calculation of damages,
placing the willfully uninsured claimant on the same footing as
the insured claimant—despite her decision to shirk her obligation
under the PPACA to maintain health insurance.55 In this way,
the individual mandate undermines the rule’s function as an
incentive to purchase health insurance.56 Some have argued that
the PPACA would undermine the collateral source rule if it were
to realize the goal of universal healthcare coverage because it
48. See Todd, supra note 6, at 972 (indicating that because “tort law is
particularly inconsistent on this point,” the corrective justice argument against
the collateral source rule is unpersuasive).
49. See Todd, supra note 6, at 982 (“The new federal healthcare legislation
and similar state healthcare initiatives potentially undermine the collateral
source rule . . . .”).
50. Pub L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
51. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012) (creating a tax penalty for individuals
who fail to obtain minimum healthcare insurance coverage).
52. See Levenson, supra note 11, at 936–48 (“In light of the [PPACA],
arguments for upholding the common law collateral source rule are no longer as
persuasive as they were before.”).
53. See id. at 934–36 (discussing the effect of the introduction of the
willfully uninsured claimant on the scope of the collateral source rule).
54. See id. at 934 (“[T]he rule would now benefit uninsured individuals who
shirk their obligations to obtain insurance under the [PPACA].”).
55. See id. at 936 (“[T]he collateral source rule allows willfully uninsured
claimants to hide their lack of health coverage during trial and during
calculation of damages.”).
56. See Todd, supra note 6, at 982 (“Some judges aver that the plaintiffinsured’s ‘foresight’ in purchasing insurance should be rewarded.”).
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would then be nearly impossible for a juror to disregard a
plaintiff’s insurance coverage when calculating damages for past
medical expenses.57 But the reality is that the PPACA does not
achieve universal healthcare coverage; rather, the patchwork of
the insurance market ultimately makes this argument against
the continued applicability of the collateral source rule following
healthcare reform unpersuasive.58
Proponents of tort reform have also criticized the collateral
source rule.59 Tort reform movements—largely driven by
corporate and insurance industry advocates and lobbyists—have
sought, among other goals, to reduce the number of lawsuits and
impose caps on noneconomic and punitive damages.60 Advocates
for tort reform have sought to eliminate the incentive the
collateral source rule creates for plaintiffs to file lawsuits.61 These
movements have led some states to completely abandon the
rule.62 While modification or abrogation of the collateral source
rule as a component of tort reform sought to introduce more
certainty and coherence to tort systems, the result often has been
fragmentation and inconsistency in the rule’s application.63
The collateral source rule has also drawn criticism due to its
effect on the ability of a trier-of-fact to calculate the accurate
reasonable cost of past medical expenses when healthcare
57. See id. at 985 (“If the [PPACA] achieves near-universal coverage, a
juror would have a difficult time disregarding insurance coverage for a
plaintiff’s tortious injuries since a juror will expect the plaintiff to have
insurance.”).
58. See id. at 968 (“The absence of universal coverage undermines the
arguments supporting the predicted demise of the collateral source rule.”).
59. See id. at 977 (“In the past twenty years, the collateral source rule came
under the greatest scrutiny by tort reform advocates.”).
60. See id. at 977–78 (describing tort reform efforts across the United
States).
61. See id. at 978 (“Because the collateral source rule apparently
‘overcompensates’ plaintiffs and provides a financial incentive for plaintiffs to
bring an action, tort reform advocates who sought to limit the number and size
of awards favored abolition of the rule.”); Wershbale, supra note 2, at 357
(“Abrogation of the collateral source rule, in concert with other tort reforms,
provides an avenue to reduce the cost of the American tort system by
eliminating many marginal cases.”).
62. See infra Part III.D (noting states that have abandoned the rule
entirely).
63. See Todd, supra note 6, at 980 (“Incoherency and fragmentation in the
law increase the cost of both the tort system and health insurance.”).
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providers write off portions of plaintiffs’ medical bills.64 Medical
providers often enter into negotiated discount agreements with
insurance providers, and the rule typically bars evidence of these
discounts.65 When a medical provider accepts less than the billed
amount for medical expenses, the collateral source rule creates a
discrepancy between the amount a plaintiff recovers and the
amount anyone actually paid.66 This issue is the main focus of
this Note because resolving it can address other criticisms of the
collateral source rule while retaining the rule’s protections.67
Despite its criticisms, the collateral source rule remains a
vital part of personal injury litigation. As one scholar put it,
“[R]eports of the impending death of the collateral source rule are
greatly exaggerated.”68 While many of the rule’s criticisms are
legitimate, it would be improper to completely abandon the
important protections the rule guarantees because the rationales
supporting the rule endure.69 Resolving the write-off issue
introduced above can balance the strengths and weaknesses of
the rule and serve as a practical compromise between retaining
the strict common law rule and completely abandoning the rule.70

64. See Lyle, supra note 26, at 853–54 (introducing the difficulty courts face
in calculating damages when hospitals’ hyperinflated list prices for medical
services are later written off).
65. See Levenson, supra note 11, at 933 (“States allow claimants to collect
write-offs under the collateral source rule because disclosure of the reduced
payment often suggests that a collateral source paid for these expenses,
undermining the purpose of keeping this information from the jury.”).
66. See id. at 932 (“Collateral sources often do not pay for medical services
at full price, allowing an insured claimant to receive medical care at a reduced
rate.”).
67. See infra Parts III–IV (presenting the write-off issue, the approaches
courts have taken to address it, and an argument in favor of a middle-ground
solution).
68. Todd, supra note 6, at 965 (referencing a quote attributed to Mark
Twain that “the reports of my death have been greatly exaggerated”).
69. See id. at 987 (“Many of the rationales in favor of maintaining the
collateral source rule remain in effect . . . .”); Krauss & Kidd, supra note 2, at 5
(arguing that victims do not receive justice where the collateral source rule has
been abandoned).
70. See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text (introducing the
complications the collateral source rule creates when confronted with write-offs
or negotiated discount agreements between insurers and healthcare providers).
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III. The Write-Off Issue and How Courts Have Addressed It

Vast discrepancies often exist between the amounts initially
billed for medical treatment and the amounts healthcare
providers ultimately accept as payment for their services.71 These
discrepancies, characterized by some as write-offs and by others
as negotiated discounts, often occur pursuant to agreements
between healthcare providers and insurance carriers that are in
place before the plaintiff receives medical treatment.72 The issue
arises when the plaintiff presents medical bills as evidence of the
reasonable cost of her past medical expenses, while in reality the
total sum paid by the plaintiff and her health insurance carrier is
substantially less.73 The collateral source rule could—and in
many jurisdictions does—prevent a defendant from introducing
evidence of the negotiated discount.74 While courts take numerous
approaches to this issue, the three most common approaches are
the traditional application of the collateral source rule,
application of a modified version of the collateral source rule, and
abandonment of the collateral source rule.75

71. See, e.g., Healthcare Costs Hearing, supra note 12, at 106 (“I have
actually seen contracts where the discount from list price was over 900 percent
and in this case the hospital was still earning a profit from the insurer because
the negotiated rate was above the hospital’s actual costs.”).
72. See, e.g., Kenney v. Liston, 760 S.E.2d 434, 450 (W. Va. 2014) (Loughry,
J., dissenting) (“[A]t the time the charges were incurred, the medical provider
and the insurer had already agreed on a different price for the services
rendered.”).
73. See, e.g., Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130
(Cal. 2011) (“The [hospital] declaration stated that of the $122,841 billed for
plaintiff's surgeries, [the insurance carrier] paid $24,380, plaintiff paid $3,566,
and the remaining $94,894 was written off or waived by [the hospital] pursuant
to the agreement between [the hospital] and the patient’s private healthcare
insurer . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
74. See Levenson, supra note 11, at 932–33 (“Under the collateral source
rule, claimants are able to collect the write-off—the difference between the
actual cost and the reasonable cost of the care paid by the collateral source.”).
75. See Lori A. Roberts, Rhetoric, Reality, and the Wrongful Abrogation of
the Collateral Source Rule in Personal Injury Cases, 31 REV. LITIG. 99, 102 (2012)
(describing the wide array of approaches state courts and legislatures have
taken to resolving the write-off issue).
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A. Traditional Application of the Common Law Collateral Source
Rule
The majority approach applies the traditional common law
collateral source rule and bars any evidence of the written-off
portion of the medical bill.76 The Supreme Court of Appeals of
76. See, e.g., McConnell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 2d 1164,
1169 (D. Nev. 2014) (finding that, under Nevada law, write-offs of medical bills
are payments within the meaning of the collateral source rule); Aumand v.
Dartmouth Hitchcock Med. Ctr., 611 F. Supp. 2d 78, 91–92 (D.N.H. 2009)
(“[T]he significant risk of unfair prejudice to [the plaintiff] from proof of what
her insurers actually paid to settle her medical bills—that is, that the jury may
improperly reduce any award to the estate—substantially outweighs any
probative value of that proof to the value of the care . . . .”); Pipkins v. TA
Operating Corp., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1261–62 (D.N.M. 2006) (“New Mexico
case law, along with the policy rationale underlying New Mexico’s adoption of
the collateral source rule, indicates that Medicare write offs would be treated
the same as any other benefit a plaintiff may receive from a collateral source.”);
Calva-Cerqueira v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 2d 279, 295–96 (D.D.C. 2003)
(“The collateral source rule applies in this case because the source of the benefit,
the plaintiff’s medical care providers’ alleged writing-off of costs, is independent
of the tortfeasor.”); Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 129 P.3d 487, 496 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2006) (“[W]e hold that [the plaintiff] was entitled to claim and recover the
full amount of her reasonable medical expenses for which she was charged,
without any reduction for the amounts apparently written off by her healthcare
providers pursuant to contractually agreed-upon rates with her medical
insurance carriers.”); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 976 S.W.2d
382, 385 (Ark. 1998) (“We choose to adopt the rule that gratuitous or discounted
medical services are a collateral source not to be considered in assessing the
damages due a personal-injury plaintiff.”); Tucker v. Volunteers of Am. Colo.
Branch, 211 P.3d 708, 712–13 (Colo. App. 2008) (“[W]e conclude that the
contract between plaintiff’s insurer and the health care providers which
decreased the amount actually paid for plaintiff’s medical care inured to
plaintiff’s benefit and falls within the [collateral source rule].”); Mitchell v.
Haldar, 883 A.2d 32, 40 (Del. 2005) (“We hold that the trial judge erred by
excluding the full amount of the medical bills as evidence of the total amount of
[the plaintiff’s] reasonable medical expenses.”); Olariu v. Marrero, 549 S.E.2d
121, 123 (Ga. 2001) (“[The defendant] is not entitled to use a third party’s writeoff of medical expenses as a set-off against [the plaintiff’s] recovery of past
medical expenses.”); Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149, 1156–57 (Haw. 2004)
(“[T]he difference between the standard rate and the Medicare/Medicaid
payment may be viewed as a part of the ‘benefits conferred on the injured party’
within the scope of the collateral source rule.”); Wills v. Foster, 892 N.E.2d 1018,
1032–33 (Ill. 2008) (“Defendants may not, however, introduce evidence that the
plaintiff's bills were settled for a lesser amount because to do so would
undermine the collateral source rule.”); Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. Miller,
177 S.W.3d 676, 683–84 (Ky. 2005) (“It is absurd to suggest that the tortfeasor
should receive a benefit from a contractual arrangement between Medicare and
the health care provider.”); White v. Jubitz Corp., 219 P.3d 566, 583 (Or. 2009)
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West Virginia illustrated the dominant reasoning that courts use
to justify a strict application of the collateral source rule to the
write-off issue in Kenney v. Liston.77 In that case, the defendant
rear-ended the plaintiff and caused “serious, permanent, painful
injuries to [the plaintiff’s] spine.”78 The plaintiff’s medical bills
were over $70,000.79 The healthcare provider accepted a lower
amount pursuant to a negotiated discount agreement with the
plaintiff’s insurance carrier.80 The defendant filed a motion in
limine arguing that the plaintiff’s recovery should be limited to
the portions of the medical bills that had been paid by either the
plaintiff or his health insurance carrier.81 The Monongalia
County Circuit Court denied the motion, finding that the writeoffs were a collateral source and the collateral source rule barred
the evidence.82
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed,
holding that the collateral source rule does not differentiate
between the types of benefits the plaintiff can receive, as long as
(“[E]xclusion of ‘write-offs’ from the amount . . . a plaintiff may claim creates the
anomaly that a defendant will be liable for the full reasonable charges that a
medical provider makes to an uninsured person . . . , but may have more limited
liability if the injured person is insured . . . .”); Covington v. George, 597 S.E.2d
142,144–45 (S.C. 2004) (“We hold that the collateral source rule is directly
implicated in this case, and the actual payment amount was properly
excluded.”); Papke v. Harbert, 738 N.W.2d 510, 535–36 (S.D. 2007) (“[T]he
collateral source rule applies and defendants are precluded from entering into
evidence the amounts ‘written off’ by medical care providers because of
contractual agreements with sources independent of defendants.”); Acuar v.
Letourneau, 531 S.E.2d 316, 322 (Va. 2000) (“The portions of medical expenses
that health care providers write off constitute compensation or indemnity
received by a tort victim from a source collateral to the tortfeasor.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., 736 N.W.2d 1, 18 (Wis.
2007) (“The admission in evidence of the amount actually paid in the present
case, even if marginally relevant, might bring complex, confusing side issues
before the fact-finder that are not necessarily related to the value of the medical
services rendered.”).
77. 760 S.E.2d 434 (W. Va. 2014).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 438.
80. Id.
81. See id. (“The defendant contends that since the full bills were neither
paid nor actually incurred by the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s health insurance
carrier, the plaintiff should not be allowed to introduce evidence of those
written-off amounts at trial.”).
82. Id.
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the benefit does not come from the defendant.83 The court
embraced the reasonable value doctrine, finding that this
interpretation of the collateral source rule allows the plaintiff to
recover the reasonable value of his medical bills, “not the
expenditures actually made or obligations incurred.”84 The
defendant had distinguished between payments and other
benefits, arguing that the collateral source rule only applies to
payments.85 The court “reject[ed] this tenuous distinction,
because the law is clear that the collateral source rule applies to
any benefit received by a plaintiff from any source in line the with
plaintiff’s interests.”86
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Allen Loughry argued that
the majority’s decision permits damages for medical bills to be
calculated “based on fictitious evidence that bears no relationship
to the plaintiff’s actual losses.”87 Justice Loughry found that “[i]t
is simply absurd to conclude that the amount billed for a certain
procedure reflects the ‘reasonable value’ of that medical service”
because medical providers utilize tactics similar to retailers that
involve exorbitant markups and subsequent discounts to ensure a
profit.88 The dissent specifically challenged the presumed
reasonability of medical bills, arguing that no evidence the
defendant could offer could overcome the presumption.89 Justice
Loughry asserted that this logic implied that healthcare

83. See id. at 445–46 (“[T]he rule that collateral source benefits are not
subtracted from a plaintiff’s recovery applies to proceeds or benefits from
sources such as insurance policies, . . . employment benefits; services or benefits
rendered gratuitously (whether free, discounted, or later written off); and social
legislation benefits.”).
84. Id. at 444; see also id. at 445 (“The damage is sustained when the
plaintiff incurs the liability, and the method by which that liability is later
discharged has no effect on the measure of damages.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
85. Id. at 444.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 449 (Loughry, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 451.
89. See id. at 452 (“What more probative evidence of the reasonable value
of the services could there be than the negotiated and paid rate for the services?
What more could a defendant offer to rebut the prima facie presumption
established in West Virginia Code § 57-5-4j?”).
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providers “routinely and as a matter of freely-negotiated
contracts accept less than the reasonable value of the services.”90
While critical of the rule’s application in this case, Justice
Loughry’s dissent did not advocate for the abandonment of the
collateral source rule.91 Rather, he found that although the
ultimate amount recoverable would be reduced, limiting recovery
to the amount actually paid would still retain the protections of
the rule.92 Justice Loughry relied heavily on California’s approach
to the collateral source rule in his dissent.93 States like California
that have modified the collateral source rule to allow defendants
to introduce evidence of write-offs have demonstrated that the
approach favored by Justice Loughry’s dissent is an effective
solution to the write-off issue.
B. Application of a Modified Version of the Collateral Source Rule
Some courts have approached the write-off issue by
modifying the strict common law collateral source rule to create
an exception that permits the defendant to introduce evidence of
write-offs.94 States that have adopted modified approaches
preserve the plaintiff’s interests protected by the collateral source
rule while acknowledging the compelling argument that the
presumption of reasonability given to medical bills is flawed in

90. Id.
91. See id. at 450 (“Precluding recovery for the ‘write-offs’ or discounts does
not contravene the collateral source rule.”).
92. See id. at 452 (“Limiting the amounts which can be recovered as
damages for medical expenses to those amounts actually paid, as opposed to
fictitious amounts generated by medical providers to ensure they can still make
a profit after giving a substantial discount, does not thwart the rationale behind
the collateral source rule.”).
93. See id. at 451 (“[T]he court found that the gratuitous services exception
to the rule limiting recovery to a plaintiff’s economic loss ‘has no application to
commercially-negotiated price agreements like those between medical providers
and health insurers,’ . . . .” (quoting Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, 257
P.3d 1130, 1139 (Cal. 2011)).
94. See Howell, 257 P.3d at 1145 (allowing the defendant to introduce
evidence that the healthcare provider accepted a discounted payment); Robinson
v. Bates, 857 N.E.2d 1195, 1200–01 (Ohio 2007) (allowing a trier-of-fact to hear
evidence of both the billed amount and discounted amount to determine the
reasonable value of past medical expenses).
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light of the fact that nearly no one actually pays these amounts.95
Courts in California and Ohio have addressed the write-off issue
through differing modified approaches that are both worth
discussion.
1. California Approach
The California approach appears in Howell v. Hamilton
Meats & Provisions, Inc.96 Here, the Supreme Court of California
addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff whose medical provider
has accepted an amount less than what is stated on the bill as
full payment should be permitted to recover the undiscounted
billed amount.97 The case arose from a car accident for which the
defendant conceded liability.98 The plaintiff’s total medical bills
were roughly $190,000—$130,000 of which was discounted
pursuant to an agreement between the hospital and insurance
carrier.99
The defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of
bills that were not paid by either the plaintiff or her health
insurance carrier.100 The trial court denied the motion, ruling
that the defendant should make a post-trial motion to reduce
medical damages.101 The defendant did so, and the trial court
granted the post-trial motion.102 The California Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the reduction violated the collateral source
rule.103
The Supreme Court of California held that the plaintiff could
not recover the undiscounted billed amount for her medical
expenses.104 The court reasoned that recoverable damages for
95. See Healthcare Service Costs Hearing, supra note 12, at 105 (“There is
not a requirement that anyone ever pays that posted price and in fact the posted
price is seldom paid.”).
96. 257 P.3d 1130 (Cal. 2011).
97. Id. at 1133.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1134.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 1145 (“[A]n injured plaintiff whose medical expenses are paid
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medical expenses “must be both incurred and reasonable.”105 The
court also found that because the agreement between the
plaintiff’s insurance carrier and the hospital was in place before
the plaintiff’s treatment, she was never actually liable for the full
amount billed.106 The court was not persuaded that the
negotiated discount was a benefit for the plaintiff; rather, the
court found that the parties to the agreement negotiated it
primarily for the benefit of the insurance carrier.107 While the
court recognized that there could be cases in which a plaintiff
would be liable for the full amount billed, it ultimately found that
it “should not order one defendant to pay damages for an
economic loss the plaintiff has not suffered merely because a
different defendant may have to compensate a different plaintiff
who has suffered such a loss.”108 Not only did the court find that
evidence of the discount was relevant and admissible, the court
went a step further and found that “[w]here the provider has, by
prior agreement, accepted less than a billed amount as full
payment, evidence of the full billed amount is not itself relevant
on the issue of past medical expenses.”109 The court left open the
question of whether the billed amount could be admissible for
some other purpose.110
through private insurance may recover as economic damages no more than the
amounts paid by the plaintiff or his or her insurer for the medical services
received or still owing at the time of trial.”).
105. Id. at 1137; see also id. at 1138 (“Thus, the general rule under the
restatement, as well as California law, is that a personal injury plaintiff may
recover the lesser of (a) the amount paid or incurred for medical services, and (b)
the reasonable value of the services.”).
106. See id. at 1139 (“[H]er prospective liability was limited to the amounts
[her insurance carrier] had agreed to pay the providers for the services they
were to render. Plaintiff cannot meaningfully be said ever to have incurred the
full charges.”).
107. See id. at 1144 (“Insurers and medical providers negotiate rates in
pursuit of their own business interests, and the benefits of the bargains made
accrue directly to the negotiating parties. The primary benefit of discounted
rates for medical care goes to the payer of those rates—that is, in largest part,
the insurer.”).
108. Id. at 1145 (citation omitted).
109. Id. at 1146.
110. See id. (suggesting that the billed amount could be relevant for
determining non-economic damages or damages for future medical expenses);
infra notes 122125 and accompanying text (proposing purposes for which the
billed amount could be admissible).
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2. Ohio Approach
The Ohio approach appears in Robinson v. Bates.111 Robinson
arose from the plaintiff’s injuries following a fall at her residence
due to her landlord’s repair work.112 The plaintiff introduced
evidence that her medical bills were $1,919 but stipulated that
the healthcare provider accepted $1,350.43 in full satisfaction of
the bill pursuant to a negotiated discount with her insurance
carrier.113 The trial court refused to admit the original medical
bills, and the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed.114
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that “both the original
medical bill rendered and the amount accepted as full payment
for medical services should have been admitted.”115 The court
found that, in addition to the amount accepted as payment, the
court should also admit the amount originally billed.116 Once the
plaintiff introduces the original amount, the court found that the
defendant should be permitted to introduce evidence that the
amount was unreasonable.117 The court found that allowing the
defendant to introduce evidence of a write-off does not contravene
the collateral source rule.118 Recognizing the disparities that can
arise from case to case, the court noted that a bright-line rule
presuming the reasonability of either the billed amount or the
discounted amount would not be appropriate.119 Rather, the
calculation of the reasonable value must be performed by the
trier-of-fact with all the relevant evidence in each specific case.120
111. 857 N.E.2d 1195 (Ohio 2006).
112. Id. at 1196–97.
113. Id. at 1197.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See id. (“[O]riginal bills are certainly evidence of the value that the
medical providers themselves place upon their services.”).
117. See id. at 1198 (“Once medical bills are admitted, a defendant may
present evidence to challenge their reasonableness.”).
118. See id. at 1200 (“[B]ecause no one pays the negotiated reduction,
admitting evidence of write-offs does not violate the purpose of the collateral
source rule.”).
119. See id. (“[I]n any given case, that determination is not necessarily the
amount of the original bill or the amount paid.”).
120. See id. (“[T]he reasonable value of medical services is a matter for the
jury to determine from all relevant evidence.”).
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The court ultimately left the responsibility of calculating the
reasonable value of medical expenses to the jury, leaving them
free to award “the amount originally billed, the amount the
medical provider accepted as payment, or some amount in
between.”121
Justice Lundberg Stratton’s opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part argued that, while both the amount billed and
the amount paid should be admissible, the plaintiff should only
be able to recover the amount actually paid for treatment.122
While she would not permit a plaintiff to recover the billed
amount, she believed that amount could be relevant “in
evaluating pain and suffering and the extent of the injuries, past
and future.”123 Justice Lundberg Stratton recognized that,
without admitting the billed amount as evidence, the seriousness
and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries could be distorted.124
Although the California court in Howell offered no opinion as to
whether the billed amount could be relevant for some purpose
other than calculating damages for past medical expense, Justice
Lundberg Stratton’s opinion in Robinson demonstrates other
purposes for which the billed amount could be relevant.125 The
Ohio legislature responded to the Robinson decision by codifying
its holding.126

121. Id.
122. See id. at 1202 (Lundberg Stratton, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“I would limit recovery for medical expenses to the amount
actually paid for treatment.”).
123. Id. at 1202–03.
124. See id. at 1202 (“For example, a plaintiff incurs a medical bill for
$10,000. . . . The $10,000 bill is settled for $2,000. However, claiming the
plaintiff incurred only $2,000 in treatment distorts the degree of medical care
and physical damages actually incurred by the plaintiff . . . .”).
125. See Howell v. Hamilton Meat Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130, 1146 (Cal.
2011) (noting that because the defendant conceded that the billed amount was
relevant in this case, the court would not offer an opinion on whether the billed
amount should be admissible to prove non-economic damages or damages for
future medical expenses).
126. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.20 (West 2015) (codifying the rule
promulgated in Robinson v. Bates).
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C. Complete or Partial Abandonment of the Collateral Source
Rule
Some states have completely abandoned the collateral source
rule, effectively eliminating the write-off issue.127 In these states,
the insurer generally retains the right to subrogate against the
tortfeasor directly.128 Similarly, certain states allow for, or
require, a post-trial damages reduction of collateral payments,
which would also eliminate the issue.129 These statutory
modifications to the collateral source rule have generally emerged
from broader tort reform efforts.130
In a series of decisions in the late 1990s, the Alabama
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the legislative
attempts to abrogate the collateral source rule.131 It ultimately
decided in Marsh v. Green132 that it was not the place of the
127. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-45 (2015) (abrogating the collateral source
rule as a rule of evidence at trial); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4545 (McKinney 2015)
(“[E]vidence shall be admissible for consideration by the court to establish that
any such past or future cost or expense was or will, with reasonable certainty,
be replaced or indemnified, in whole or in part, from any collateral source . . . .”).
128. See Todd, supra note 6, at 993 (“In Alabama, the plaintiff’s insurer,
however, would be able to exercise its subrogation rights against the
defendant . . . .”).
129. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.17.070 (West 2015) (“After the fact
finder has rendered an award to a claimant, . . . defendant may introduce
evidence of amounts received or to be received by the claimant as compensation
for the same injury from collateral sources that do not have a right of
subrogation by law or contract.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76(1) (West 2015) (“[T]he
court shall reduce the amount of such award by the total of all amounts which
have been paid for the benefit of the claimant, or which are otherwise available
to the claimant, from all collateral sources . . . .”).
130. See Todd, supra note 6, at 977–80 (describing the status of the
collateral source rule in states that have adopted tort reform). Todd argues that
the efforts to improve tort systems by abrogating the collateral source rule have
instead “created greater fragmentation and inconsistency.” Id. at 979.
131. See Marsh v. Green, 782 So. 2d 223 (Ala. 2000) (finding the statutory
abrogation of the collateral source rule to be constitutional); Am. Legion Post
No. 57 v. Leahy, 681 So. 2d 1337, 1338 (Ala. 1996), overruled by Marsh v. Green,
782 So. 2d 223 (Ala. 2000) (finding the statutory abrogation of the collateral
source rule to be unconstitutional); see also Benjamin B. Coulter, No Longer as
Good as Dead: The Continued Revival of Alabama’s Medical and Hospital
Expenses Exception to the Collateral Source Rule a Decade After Marsh, 42
CUMB. L. REV. 299, 301–11 (2012) (recounting the history of the collateral source
rule in Alabama).
132. 782 So. 2d 223 (Ala. 2000).
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courts to assess the wisdom of otherwise constitutional action by
the legislature.133 While the court allowed the abandonment of
the rule to stand in the end, its initial reluctance to do so signals
that the rule remains a critical part of the tort system in the eyes
of the courts.134
IV. Argument in Favor of the California Approach
The traditional common law collateral source rule has drawn
legitimate criticism as to its relevance in modern tort law.135
Abandoning the rule altogether, however, has had equally
troublesome results.136 A compromise that limits the scope of the
rule without completely abandoning it is the most workable
solution. A modified approach to the collateral source rule that
allows defendants to introduce evidence of written-off medical
bills can serve as an effective method of preserving the
protections of the rule while limiting inflated damage awards.137
While California and Ohio have both solved the write-off issue
without abandoning the collateral source rule, the California

133. See id. at 231 (“These concerns deal with the wisdom of legislative
policy rather than constitutional issues. Matters of policy are for the Legislature
and, whether wise or unwise, legislative policies are of no concern to the
courts.”). High courts in other states that have attempted to abandon the
collateral source rule statutorily have struck down the legislation as
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Farley v. Engelken, 740 P.2d 1058, 1068 (Kan. 1987)
(finding that the abrogation of the collateral source rule violated equal
protection); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 838 (N.H. 1980) (same); Armeson
v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 137 (N.D. 1978) (finding that abrogating the
collateral source rule violated substantive due process).
134. See Marsh, 782 So. 2d at 231 (“[A] court cannot hold a statute invalid
because of its view that there are elements therein which are violative of
natural justice or in conflict with the court's notions of natural, social, or
political rights of the citizen.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
135. See supra Part II.B (presenting the arguments in favor of abandoning
the collateral source rule).
136. See Todd, supra note 6, at 979 (arguing that tort reform has “created
greater fragmentation and inconsistency” in tort law).
137. See infra Parts IV.A–IV.B (evaluating the effect of the California
approach on each of the rationales and criticisms of the collateral source rule).
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approach is most practical.138 Although it is not perfect, it can be
altered to compensate for many of the concerns it creates.139
A. A Modified Approach Preserves the Protections of the Collateral
Source Rule
The collateral source rule is supported by many rationales,
such as its deterrent effect,140 its litigation finance role,141 its
interplay with the reasonable value doctrine,142 the fact that
plaintiffs pay for the benefit of health insurance,143 and the rule’s
integration into the subrogation process.144 Because abandoning
the rule would undermine these still relevant purposes, a
modified approach is the best method of reforming the collateral
source rule. Although a modified approach does not entirely
preserve each of these rationales,145 it is nonetheless the most
practical way to balance the purposes of the rule with the reality
of modern healthcare billing practices.
A modified approach best preserves the collateral source
rule’s desirable deterrent effect because the defendant pays the
entire amount incurred for medical expenses, not just the amount
the plaintiff herself paid.146 In jurisdictions where the collateral
138. See infra Part IV.C (arguing that the California approach is more
practical than the Ohio approach).
139. See infra Part IV.D (proposing alterations to the California approach).
140. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text (describing the deterrent
effect of the collateral source rule).
141. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text (describing the litigation
finance role of the collateral source rule).
142. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text (describing the
interaction between the collateral source rule and the reasonable value rule).
143. See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text (describing the argument
that the collateral source rule does not create a windfall because plaintiff has
paid for the benefit of health insurance).
144. See supra notes 37–42 and accompanying text (describing the
relationship between the collateral source rule and subrogation).
145. See infra Part IV.D (describing the effect of a modified approach on the
litigation finance role of the collateral source rule).
146. Compare Howell v. Hamilton Meat Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130,
1145 (Cal. 2011) (permitting a plaintiff to recover only the amount the medical
provider accepted as payment for medical services), and Robinson v. Bates, 857
N.E.2d 1195, 1200–01 (Ohio 2007) (permitting the trier-of-fact to determine the
reasonable value of medical services after both the amount billed and amount
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source rule has been abandoned, the plaintiff’s health insurance
carrier must initiate separate proceedings against the defendant
to recover the portion of the plaintiff’s medical bills it paid.147
This method of subrogation imposes a larger cost on insurance
carriers than the typical method in which the carrier subrogates
against the plaintiff directly.148 This higher cost could cause the
carrier to forgo subrogation against the defendant.149 In those
cases, the defendant’s liability is ultimately much less than the
reasonable value of the plaintiff’s medical expenses—arguably
substantially reducing the defendant’s deterrence.
A modified approach works best with the reasonable value
doctrine because almost no one can reasonably be expected to pay
the billed amount.150 Discounts are far reaching: healthcare
providers negotiate these discounts not only with health
insurance carriers, but also with Medicare, Medicaid, and similar
state-run programs.151 Even uninsured patients could receive
discounts in some cases.152 Given the widespread nature of these
discounts, the presumption of reasonability favoring the billed
amount is flawed and should be re-evaluated. That is not to say
that the billed amount is inherently unreasonable; rather, the
circumstances in which that amount is reasonable are so rare
accepted as payment have been introduced to evidence), with ALA. CODE § 12-2145 (2015) (limiting a plaintiff’s recovery to the amount she actually paid by
abrogating the collateral source rule).
147. See, e.g., Todd, supra note 6, at 993 (indicating that in jurisdictions in
which the collateral source rule has been abandoned, the insurance carrier may
pursue subrogation rights against a defendant directly).
148. See Wershbale, supra note 2, at 349–50 (describing the high
administrative costs associated with subrogation).
149. See Todd, supra note 6, at 995 (noting that “insurers typically do not
bring direct actions” against defendants); Wershbale, supra note 2, at 349
(“[I]nsurers often do not exercise the right to subrogation.”).
150. See Healthcare Service Costs Hearing, supra note 12, at 105 (“Under
the current system hospitals and physicians have the ability to post any price
they choose. There is not a requirement that anyone ever pays that posted price
and in fact the posted price is seldom paid.”).
151. See Howell, 257 P.3d at 1142 (“Because so many patients, insured,
uninsured, and recipients under government healthcare programs, pay
discounted rates, hospital bills have been called insincere, in the sense that they
would yield truly enormous profits if those prices were actually paid.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
152. See id. (“In California, medical providers are expressly authorized to
offer the uninsured discounts . . . .”).
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that a presumption of reasonability is misplaced.153 Thus, in
reality, the traditional collateral source rule serves to undermine
the reasonable value doctrine rather than support it. A modified
approach permits the trier-of-fact to arrive at the reasonable
value for medical expenses more effectively than under the
common law collateral source rule.
Advocates for the collateral source rule argue that the
defendant should not benefit from the plaintiff’s decision to
maintain health insurance coverage, and because the plaintiff
paid for that benefit through monthly insurance premiums, she
should be able to recover the full amount of her medical bills.154 A
modified approach preserves this function of the collateral source
rule because, while the plaintiff is not permitted to recover the
write-off, she is still permitted to recover the full amount that she
and her insurance carrier actually paid.155 The defendant does
not benefit from the plaintiff’s choice to maintain insurance
coverage because she must still pay the full cost of her
wrongdoing, as measured by the amount the healthcare provider
accepted as payment for its services.156 In addition, because
discounts may be available even to uninsured patients in certain
cases, the amount the defendant pays may be the same
regardless of whether the plaintiff was insured.157
A modified approach does not change the way the plaintiff’s
insurance carrier exercises its subrogation rights. The plaintiff’s
insurance carrier is only entitled to the portion of the plaintiff’s
recovery that it actually paid, making the fact that the plaintiff
does not recover the write-off irrelevant to the subrogation

153. See Healthcare Service Costs Hearing, supra note 12, at 105 (indicating
that charged amounts are seldom actually paid).
154. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 8.6(3) (“[I]t is said that the collateral source
rule encourages the plaintiff to protect himself by the purchase of insurance by
making sure he reaps its value.”).
155. See Howell, 257 P.3d at 1145 (holding that the plaintiff may recover
“the amounts paid by the plaintiff or his or her insurer for the medical services
received or still owing at the time of trial”).
156. See supra notes 150–153 and accompanying text (arguing that the
amount the healthcare provider accepts as payment should be the presumed
reasonable value of the services).
157. See Howell, 257 P.3d at 1142 (indicating that hospitals in California are
permitted to offer discounts to uninsured patients).
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issue.158 In states where the collateral source rule has been
abandoned, the health insurance carrier must subrogate against
the defendant.159 This method is less desirable for both the
plaintiff’s health insurance carrier and the defendant’s liability
insurance carrier.160 It is easier and more cost-effective for the
plaintiff’s carrier to subrogate against the plaintiff directly.161 In
states where the health insurance carrier must pursue
subrogation against the defendant, the defendant’s liability
insurance carrier is left uncertain as to the possibility of separate
subrogation proceedings after trial. By contrast, a modified
approach preserves the traditional relationship between the
collateral source rule and subrogation, allowing courts to adopt
the approach without concern that the subrogation procedure will
be undermined.162
B. A Modified Approach Also Addresses Some of the Rule’s
Criticisms
The collateral source rule has been challenged on the
grounds that it allows the plaintiff to receive a double-recovery,163
on the grounds that it allows plaintiffs to recover artificially
inflated retail mark-ups on medical expenses that are ultimately

158. See Roberts, supra note 75, at 137–38 (“A right of subrogation extends
only to amounts paid by the insurer and therefore the right to subrogation does
not allow a health care insurer to recover the amount of the contractual writeoff.”).
159. See Todd, supra note 6, at 993 (describing subrogation in states that
have abandoned the collateral source rule).
160. See id. at 995 (indicating that health insurance carriers prefer not to
bring actions directly against defendants).
161. See id. at 996 (noting that most states prefer post-trial reduction of a
plaintiff’s damages award rather than separate proceedings between the
plaintiff’s insurance carrier and the defendant).
162. See Howell, 257 P.3d at 1135 (“Since insurance policies frequently allow
the insurer to reclaim the benefits paid out of a tort recovery by refund or
subrogation, the rule, without providing the plaintiff a double recovery, ensures
the tortfeasor cannot avoid payment of full compensation for the injury
inflicted.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
163. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text (presenting the
argument that the collateral source rule is contrary to the notion of corrective
justice).
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written off,164 and on the grounds that healthcare and tort reform
have eroded the role of the rule in modern litigation.165 In
addition to solving the write-off issue, a modified approach also
ameliorates many of the rule’s other criticisms.
Critics of the collateral source rule argue that it permits the
plaintiff to recover an unfair windfall.166 Proponents of the rule
argue that this double-recovery is necessary to ensure that the
defendant pays the full cost of her wrongdoing.167 A modified
approach strikes a balance between these two viewpoints by
reducing the amount the plaintiff can recover while still ensuring
that the defendant pays the reasonable cost of her wrongdoing.168
This approach best satisfies both understandings of corrective
justice: the wronged plaintiff is made whole, and the defendant
pays the full cost of her wrongdoing.169
On its face, abandoning the rule could arguably be the best
solution in light of healthcare reform. If the PPACA’s individual
mandate were taken to mean universal access to health
insurance, then the collateral source rule would be unnecessary
in the context of damages for medical expenses.170 This is not,
164. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text (introducing the write-off
problem).
165. See supra notes 49–63 and accompanying text (describing the
arguments that the collateral source rule should be abandoned due to
healthcare reform and tort reform).
166. See Todd, supra note 6, at 972 (“This double recovery scenario creates a
situation where the plaintiff is put in a better position than before the tort
occurred, thereby conflicting with the compensatory function of tort law.”).
167. See Krause & Kidd, supra note 2, at 22 (asserting that the tortfeasor
has a duty to compensate the victim that should not be “extinguished by favors
bestowed on the victim by a third party”).
168. See supra notes 150–153 and accompanying text (arguing that the
discounted amount represents the reasonable value of medical services).
169. See Krause & Kidd, supra note 2, at 26–28 (describing the relationship
between the collateral source rule and the two competing understandings of
corrective justice: making victims whole and righting wrongs). Krause and Kidd
argue that the collateral source rule is best understood in the context of a
corrective justice system based on righting wrongs rather than making victims
whole. See id. at 28 (“When the collateral source rule is displayed side by side
with a system of corrective justice based on correlativity and personality,
wherein tort law is not concerned with making the victim whole but rather with
righting wrongs, the two emerge harmoniously.”).
170. See Todd, supra note 6, at 967 (“[T]he collateral source rule, when
applied to medical expenses covered by health insurers, has less utility when
there is universal healthcare coverage, as aspired to under the [PPACA].”).
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however, a realistic characterization of the individual mandate—
there is not universal access to health insurance. 171 Even if there
were, there are vast differences between health insurance
policies.172 The California approach recognizes the increased
access to negotiated discounts following the individual mandate,
yet preserves the still necessary protections of the collateral
source rule.173
A modified approach also addresses some of the goals of tort
reform without destroying the protections of the collateral source
rule. A primary aim of tort reform is to reduce excessive damage
awards.174 By eliminating the write-off from the plaintiff’s
recovery, a modified approach reduces the artificial inflation of
medical expenses but avoids the erratic effects of abandoning the
collateral source rule.175 Thus, a modified approach serves as an
effective compromise that achieves a measure of meaningful
reform without undermining the purposes of the collateral source
rule.
C. The California Approach Is Most Practical
While both California and Ohio courts allow a defendant to
introduce evidence of a write-off, the two approaches have notable
differences.176 The Ohio approach permits parties to introduce
171. See id. at 968 (“The absence of universal coverage undermines the
arguments supporting the predicted demise of the collateral source rule.”).
172. See, e.g., Healthcare Service Costs Hearing, supra note 12, at 106
(discussing the widely varying nature of the discounts for healthcare services).
173. See Paige Winfield Cunningham, New England Journal of Medicine
Report:
10
Million
Newly
Insured,
POLITICO
(Jul.
23,
2014),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/07/new-england-journal-of-medicine-reportobamacare-109304.html (last visited June 5, 2015) (reporting that one study
found that 10 million Americans were newly insured because of the PPACA) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
174. See Wershbale, supra note 2, at 349 (“The concern is that where the
fact-finder remains uninformed, or there is no collateral source setoff, a
successful plaintiff acquires a windfall, being awarded monetary damages in
excess of necessary and reasonable medical costs.”).
175. See Todd, supra note 6, at 979 (describing the inconsistent and
fragmented practical results of abandoning the collateral source rule).
176. Compare Howell v. Hamilton Meat Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130,
1146 (Cal. 2011) (limiting a plaintiff’s recovery to the amount actually paid by
the plaintiff and her health insurance carrier), with Robinson v. Bates, 857
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evidence of both the amount initially billed and the amount
ultimately collected to the trier-of-fact, who then ultimately bears
the burden of deciding the reasonable value of the medical
services.177 By contrast, the California approach only permits a
plaintiff to recover the amount accepted as payment, and goes as
far as to say that the amount initially billed is inadmissible
because it is irrelevant to the calculations of economic damages
for past medical expenses.178
On its face, the Ohio approach better enables a trier-of-fact to
perform its duty to ascertain the reasonable value of medical
expenses because this approach permits parties to introduce the
maximum amount of information into evidence.179 In theory, the
trier-of-fact can parse through the complex records, bills, and
discounts to arrive at the reasonable value.180 Parties could hire
expert witnesses to assist the judge or jury in understanding the
complicated and largely arbitrary systems medical providers use
to value their services.181 However, the resources required to
effectively educate judges and juries on hospital billing practices
in even the most routine personal injury cases would be
enormous.182 These costs can be avoided by employing the
N.E.2d 1195, 1197 (Ohio 2006) (allowing a jury to determine the reasonable
value of medical expenses after considering all the relevant evidence, including
both the amount billed and the amount accepted as payment).
177. See Robinson, 857 N.E.2d at 1197 (“[B]oth the original bill rendered
and the amount accepted as full payment for medical services should have been
admitted . . . .”).
178. See Howell, 257 P.3d at 1146 (“Where the provider has, by prior
agreement, accepted less than a billed amount as full payment, evidence of the
full billed amount is not itself relevant on the issue of past medical expenses.”).
179. See Robinson, 857 N.E.2d at 1200 (“Due to the realities of today's
insurance and reimbursement system, in any given case, that determination is
not necessarily the amount of the original bill or the amount paid. Instead, the
reasonable value of medical services is a matter for the jury to determine from
all relevant evidence.”).
180. See id. (“To avoid the creation of separate categories of plaintiffs based
on individual insurance coverage, we decline to adopt a categorical rule. Because
different insurance arrangements exist, the fairest approach is to make the
defendant liable for the reasonable value of plaintiff's medical treatment.”).
181. See, e.g., Healthcare Service Costs Hearing, supra note 12, at 106 (“The
hospitals often do not know how they set each charge on the charge master file.
There is not a formula that hospitals use to set charges. . . . [T]he charges are
not set by market forces or using a systematic methodology.”).
182. Cf. Howell, 257 P.3d at 1142 (“The dissent's proposal that the insured
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California approach, which assumes that the amount the
healthcare provider accepted as payment was the commercially
reasonable value of the medical services.183
The California approach allows a measure of predictability in
litigation that the Ohio approach does not. Allowing a trier-of-fact
to determine which is most reasonable between the amounts a
medical provider initially bills and the amount it ultimately
collects introduces yet another wildcard into already
unpredictable civil litigation.184 Given the large percentage of
personal injury cases that are settled before trial, the California
approach permits parties to negotiate a settlement with an
accurate standard that reflects the likely calculation of medical
expenses at trial.185
D. Altering the California Approach
The California approach is the most practical solution to the
write-off issue. The approach is not, however, without its
plaintiff recover the ‘reasonable value’ of his or her care, to be proven in each
case by expert testimony is also troubling because it would routinely involve
violations of the evidentiary aspect of the collateral source rule.”).
183. Cf. Kenney v. Liston, 460 S.E.2d 434, 452 (W. Va. 2014) (Loughry, J.,
dissenting) (“Are we to blindly accept the fiction that hospitals and other
medical providers routinely and as a matter of freely-negotiated contracts accept
less than the reasonable value of their services?”). It is worth noting that while
this Note argues that the amount accepted as payment should be presumed to
be the reasonable value of medical services, the California court did not engage
in a reasonableness analysis. Rather, the court seemed to suggest that the
plaintiff can only recover the amount that was actually paid, even if that
amount was unreasonably low. See Howell, 257 P.3d at 1138 (“Thus the general
rule under the Restatement, as well as California law, is that a personal injury
plaintiff may recover the lesser of (a) the amount paid or incurred for medical
services, and (b) the reasonable value of the services.”). The solution this Note
proposes alters this approach to ensure that the plaintiff recovers the
reasonable value of her medical expenses, even in cases where the provider
accepted an unreasonably low amount as payment. See infra Part IV.D
(proposing alterations to the California approach that would address the main
concerns, such as reasonability).
184. See generally Valerie P. Hans & Theodore Eisenberg, The Predictability
of Juries, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 375 (2011) (evaluating the predictability of jury
trials).
185. See Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1919, 1951–56 (2009) (discussing the dominant role of settlement in civil
litigation).
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shortcomings. The bright-line rule that a plaintiff can only
recover the amount she and her insurance carrier actually paid
constrains the role of the jury in calculating damages. In
addition, the approach may eliminate the collateral source rule’s
function as a method for plaintiffs to finance litigation. Finally,
the California approach could theoretically incentivize
individuals not to procure insurance coverage as mandated by the
PPACA. Although some of these concerns cannot be easily
rectified, most can be addressed by altering the approach.
By setting the amount actually paid as the maximum
amount the plaintiff can receive, the California approach heavily
constrains the role of the jury in determining appropriate
damages for past medical expenses.186 This weakness could be
overcome by altering the approach so that the amount paid is
presumed reasonable, but the plaintiff may rebut the
presumption by introducing evidence that the amount accepted
as payment was unreasonable. This would account for the
scenario in which a healthcare provider does accept an
unreasonably low amount as payment for medical care. This
would also preserve the role of the jury in determining whether
the amount was reasonable by essentially reversing the common
presumption that medical bills are prima facie evidence of
reasonable medical expenses.187
Limiting the common law collateral source rule erodes the
litigation finance role of the collateral source rule. The amount a
plaintiff receives in excess of what she and her insurance carrier
paid has allowed the plaintiff to be made whole even after paying
her attorney.188 By eliminating this amount from the plaintiff’s
recovery, the plaintiff must pay her attorneys’ fees out of her own
186. See Howell, 257 P.3d at 1146 (“Where a trial jury has heard evidence of
the amount accepted as full payment by the medical provider but has awarded a
greater sum as damages for past medical expenses, the defendant may move for
a new trial on grounds of excessive damages.”).
187. See supra note 10 (presenting the statutory provisions in Virginia and
West Virginia giving medical bills a prima facie presumption of reasonability).
188. See Jeremy Kidd, To Fund or Not to Fund: The Need for Second Best
Solutions to the Litigation Finance Dilemma, 8 J. L. ECON & POL’Y 613, 638
(2012) (“While not traditionally thought of as a form of litigation finance, the
common law doctrine known as the ‘collateral source rule’ provides some relief
to poor and middle-class tort victims as they recuperate and attempt to recover
from a tortfeasor.”).
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pocket in cases in which punitive damages or pain and suffering
damages are not sufficient to finance these costs. This approach
could prevent plaintiffs from bringing otherwise legitimate
lawsuits or prevent plaintiffs’ attorneys from being paid.189 As a
result, this could lead to conflict between the plaintiff’s insurance
carrier and her attorney about which party gets paid and which
party does not should the carrier choose to subrogate. While this
is a legitimate concern, the collateral source rule does not create
this problem. Rather, the rule has enabled a work-around that
allows a plaintiff to pay both her insurance carrier and her
attorney.190 The heart of this problem lies with the contingency
fee arrangements plaintiffs’ attorneys employ to finance
litigation. The solution to this problem may come through
reforming litigation financing practices, or possibly through
instituting a loser-pays civil litigation system, but it ultimately
rests outside the scope of any reasonably practical modification to
the collateral source rule.191
A modified approach may also encourage patients to shirk
their obligations to procure health insurance under the PPACA.
Because the approach limits the plaintiff’s recovery to the amount
actually paid, a potential claimant would receive a higher
recovery if her hospital bills were not discounted at all. In
general, the only patients that pay undiscounted rates are the
uninsured.192 This creates a theoretical reason not to procure
insurance coverage, although in reality few people factor future
tort recovery into their decision about whether to procure health
insurance.193
189. See DOBBS, supra note 3, at 494–95 (asserting that the collateral source
rule allows a plaintiff to pad her damage award so that she can pay her
attorneys’ fees and still be made whole).
190. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text (explaining how the
collateral source rule has permitted plaintiffs to finance litigation by allowing
the payment of attorneys’ fees out of the damages for expenses already paid by a
collateral source).
191. See Kidd, supra note 188, at 617 (asserting that the best solution to the
litigation finance problem is to expand access to traditional modes of finance
and market credit to encompass litigation).
192. See Healthcare Service Costs Hearing, supra note 12, at 99 (“The only
patients asked to pay these full charges are the uninsured, some people with
high deductible health savings accounts, and the international visitors.”).
193. Cf. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 8.6(3) (“[I]t may be said that if the plaintiff
has paid for the insurance benefits, he probably did not do so in hope of a double
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Altering the California approach to create a rebuttable
presumption rather than a bright-line rule creates the most
workable and fair solution to bring the collateral source rule in
line with the reality of modern healthcare billing practices. This
would ensure that plaintiffs receive reasonable compensation for
medical expenses without introducing the added cost and
uncertainty to litigation that the Ohio approach would create.194
While this alteration to the California approach does not solve
every potential issue, it does preserve the essential protections of
the collateral source rule while also accomplishing meaningful
and practical reform that reduces artificially inflated damage
awards based upon unreasonably high valuations of medical
expenses.195

V. Conclusion
While often the subject of debate, the collateral source rule
remains an important and relevant part of the American tort
system.196 The rule nonetheless creates a dilemma when
confronted with the reality that plaintiffs rarely pay billed
amounts for medical expenses.197 This raises questions as to
whether the presumption that medical bills are prima facie
evidence of the reasonable value of medical services is
appropriate.198 Of the approaches courts have taken to this issue,
the Supreme Court of California’s modified approach most
effectively resolves the issue.199 The approach serves as a middle
recovery.”).
194. See supra notes 179–185 and accompanying text (arguing that the Ohio
approach introduces unnecessary expense and uncertainty into litigation).
195. See Healthcare Service Costs Hearing, supra note 12, at 106 (describing
scenarios in which there is a negotiated discount of as high as 900 percent yet
the hospital still receives a profit).
196. See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text (describing the rise of the
collateral source rule as a fundamental pillar of the tort system).
197. See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text (introducing the write-off
problem).
198. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text (arguing that statutory
presumptions of medical bills’ reasonability undermine the trier-of-fact’s ability
to accurately determine the reasonable value of past medical expenses).
199. See supra notes 176–185 and accompanying text (arguing that the
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ground between the traditional application of the collateral
source rule and abandonment of the rule. The plaintiff retains the
benefit of the collateral source rule by recovering the total
amount both she and her insurance carrier paid, yet defendants
do not pay artificially inflated damages. While the approach is
not perfect, courts can alter it to address most concerns.200 By
implementing this altered version of the California approach to
the write-off issue, courts can achieve meaningful and practical
reform to the tort system without abandoning the protections of
the collateral source rule.

California approach is the most practical way to reduce inflated awards for
medical expenses).
200. See supra notes 186–195 and accompanying text (proposing alterations
to the California approach to address its potential shortcomings).

